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WHAT LEVEL OF FIDUCIARY DUTY SHOULD
MORTGAGE BROKERS OWE THEIR
BORROWERS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of borrowers purchasing or refinancing a home today obtain
their mortgage loans through a mortgage broker.' Within the last decade,2
mortgage brokers have surpassed the traditional mortgage lenders3 as the
main providers of residential mortgage services.4 Although reasons cited for
1. For the purpose of this Note, the term "mortgage broker" refers to any entity that solicits,
processes and/or places a mortgage loan with a third-party mortgage lender on behalf of a borrower.
Because a mortgage broker does not provide the actual funds for the loan, she acts only as an
intermediary between a borrower seeking funds for the purchase or refinance of a home and the
mortgage lender who ultimately provides these funds.
2. See George A. Platz, Avoiding and Defending Residential Mortgage Litigation Involving
Loan Broker Compensation, Release Fees, and Defective Home Improvements, in FINANCIAL
SERVICES LITIGATION: NEW PRODUCTS, HOT ISSUES, HIGH EXPOSURE-COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT
ISSUES, CONSUMER CREDIT ISSUES 737 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1996) ("Whereas only a small
minority of residential mortgage loans involved a mortgage broker less than ten years ago, broker
loans today comprise the majority"); John Manners, How You Can Save With a Mortgage Broker,
MONEY, Feb. 1994, at 183 ("[IThe number of brokers has nearly tripled to 18,500 in the past six years.
They now arrange nearly half the 700,000 mortgage loans issued each month").
3. For the purpose of this Note, the term "mortgage lender" refers to any entity that provides
mortgage loans using their own funds. Mortgage lenders are comprised of three principal types of
lending institutions: banks, insurance companies and mortgage bankers. A "bank" is the generic term
used for any depository institution that, in addition to other banking services, places or refinances
mortgage loans using depository funds. After funding the mortgage loan, a bank may either retain the
mortgage loan in its own loan portfolio, or may resell the loan on the secondary mortgage market.
Because banks possess this dual ability, they are usually willing to make both conforming loans (i.e.,
loans that meet the necessary requirements to be eligible for sale on the secondary market) and non-
conforming loans (i.e., loans that do not meet the requirements of the secondary market and must be
retained in the lender's portfolio). The term "bank," therefore, refers both to commercial banks as well
as thrift institutions, such as savings banks, savings and loans, and credit unions.
Insurance companies fund mortgage loans from the insurance premiums paid to them by their
policy holders. Because insurance companies retain these mortgages in their loan portfolio, they do not
need to satisfy the requirements of the secondary market. As a result, most insurance companies focus
their lending in the area of non-conforming loans. A mortgage banker is a non-depository entity whose
sole function is to place or refinance mortgage loans using its own funds. After closing the mortgage
loan, a mortgage banker resells the mortgage loan on the secondary mortgage market, recouping the
funds it lent, and re-lending these funds to future borrowers. Because mortgage bankers must meet the
requirements of the secondary market, they typically limit their lending to conforming loan programs.
Mortgage bankers are not depository institutions themselves, so most mortgage bankers are affiliated
with or owned by an institution that is able to provide the mortgage broker with the money necessary
to fund their mortgages.
4. Most authorities agree that mortgage brokers currently originate at least half of all residential
home mortgages. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Bias in Pricing ofMortgage Fees Cuts Across Lines of
Race, Sex, Age, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 1996, at F01, available in 1996 WL 12393515
("J[]ndependent mortgage brokers... [are] the source of 40 percent to 50 percent of all new home
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the recent increase in the mortgage broker's market share vary,5 this
expansion will undoubtedly result in increased litigation by borrowers
against mortgage brokers.6 Such litigation could carry potentially grave
consequences for mortgage brokers because many courts have imposed a
general fiduciary duty7 on a mortgage broker's dealings with its borrowers,
but have not required such a duty of mortgage lenders. The result of this
discrepancy is that mortgage brokers face potentially greater liability than
mortgage lenders for conducting essentially the same mortgage transaction.8
Part II discusses the components of agency and fiduciary duty, and
explores situations in which courts have held mortgage brokers liable for a
breach of a general fiduciary duty. Part IT analyzes the inequity of imposing
a general fiduciary duty on mortgage brokers in light of most courts'
unwillingness to impose a similar duty not only on mortgage lenders, but also
on other brokers possessing characteristics and responsibilities similar to
loan originations nationwide"); H. Jane Lehman, HUD Re-Examines Law Designed to Protect
Borrowers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 1996, at JI, available in 1996 WL 2578857 ("[M]ortgage
brokers... originated 65 percent of the residential mortgage business [in 1995]"); John Manners, How
You Can Save With a Mortgage Broker, MONEY, Feb. 1994, at 183 ("[Mortgage brokers] now arrange
nearly half the 700,000 mortgage loans issued each month").
5. Any number of factors have contributed to the increased market share of mortgage brokers,
including: the ability of mortgage brokers to offer a greater variety of loan programs than single
mortgage lenders; the ability of mortgage brokers to secure approval of certain types of mortgage loans
that conventional mortgage lenders cannot; the demise of savings and loan institutions in the 1980s;
and the increased reliance of banks on independent mortgage brokers in order to eliminate the bank's
cost of maintaining their own branch lending offices. See Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Picking the Wrong
Mortgage Broker Can Become a Homeowner's Nightmare, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1992, at Cl,
available in 1992 WL-WSJ 659864.
6. Mary Burt and Christian Jones note that the potential for litigation by borrowers against
mortgage brokers exists because of the great variation in state legislation governing mortgage brokers:
The retail mortgage lending industry is subject to great variations in state regulation. There is little
agreement both inside and outside of the industry as to its legal duties. It is not even clear how
participants-- particularly mortgage brokers-should be classified... It is not hard to predict that
this legal uncertainty under state law will likely focus first on mortgage brokers, as it did in the
RESPA rulemaking proceedings. Because brokers interact directly with consumers, they can be
expected to be one of the first objects of scrutiny. Further, we believe that scrutiny will largely
involve the duty owed to borrowers by mortgage brokers. This theme is already being played out
in the media, the legislatures, and the courts. The legal question being asked is: Does a mortgage
broker owe a fiduciary duty to an applicant for a mortgage loan?
Mary J. Burt & Christian T. Jones, Comment, Clearer State, Federal Laws Crucial to Disclosure Talks
Series: 16, AM. BANKER, May 31, 1996, at 9, available in 1996 WL 5565402.
7. See infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences between a
general and a specific fiduciary duty.
8. See Theodore H. Hellmuth, Lender Liability and Fiduciary Obligation: Dentures for a
"Toothless Lion, " 3 PROB. & PROP. 20, 22 (1989) ("The lender who acts as a fiduciary to the borrower
is liable for almost anything; the lender who does not is liable for almost nothing. This is not simply
hyperbole. The average borrower must fend for himself or herself when negotiating the average loan.
To the contrary, when a lender who is a fiduciary gains an advantage over the borrower, there is a
presumption of unfairness!).
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mortgage brokers. In addition, Part I analyzes current regulation of
mortgage brokers at the federal and state level. Finally, Part IV proposes that
courts should refrain from imposing a general fiduciary duty on mortgage
brokers. Instead, courts should rely on existing regulations and market forces
to insure that mortgage brokers deal fairly with their borrowers. This Note
argues that state legislatures that have imposed a general fiduciary duty on
mortgage brokers should, at the very least, permit borrowers and mortgage
brokers to contract around the duplicative requirements of a general fiduciary
duty.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND MORTGAGE BROKERS
A. Overview of Fiduciary Duty
Analysis of fiduciary duty "comprises two fundamental issues: first,
whether the relationship is fiduciary or not; and second, if it is, whether the
resulting fiduciary duties were breached."9 In addressing the first issue,
courts must determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists between the
parties involved in a specific transaction. Courts typically find "there are two
types of fiduciary relationships: (1) those specifically created by contract or a
formal legal relationship, such as principal and agent ... and (2) those
implied in law due to the factual situation surrounding the transactions and
relationships of the parties to each other and to the questioned
transactions. 10 This first type of fiduciary relationship, based upon the
formal legal status of the parties involved,"1 is termed "agency." Agency is
defined as the "fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act" 12 This
manifestation may be written (i.e., contract) or may be inferred from the
relationship of the parties. Within the agency relationship, the agent becomes
a fiduciary of the principal and must act for the principal's benefit as to
9. Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 21,
26(1992).
10. Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544,546 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
11. Relationships that fall under this category of fiduciary relations are fairly easy to detect,
mainly because the legal status of the parties to a transaction, or the legal documents that provided the
basis for the transaction, are usually incontrovertible. The most common legal relationships that give
rise to general fiduciary duties are: (1) principal-agent; (2) attorney-client; (3) trustee-beneficiary;
(4) partner-partner, (5) escrowee-beneficiary; and (6) guardian-ward. Denison State Bank v. Madeira,
640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
1997] 1739
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matters within the scope of the agency.13 For the purpose of this Note, it is
the agency relationship that gives rise to a "general fiduciary duty."' 4 The
second category of fiduciary relationships involves a "specific" fiduciary
relationship that arises as a result of circumstances specific to the parties'
transaction. 5 Therefore, even though general fiduciary duties may not arise
at the outset of a transaction, the particular circumstances of the transaction
may give rise to specific fiduciary duties.16
After determining that a fiduciary relationship has arisen, a court must
then determine whether the actions of the fiduciary breached the duties
imposed by the fiduciary relationship. Although courts do not apply a
uniform standard to determine which specific duties are encompassed within
"fiduciary duty," the following duties are generally included: duty of
loyalty,17 duty of good faith, duty of due care 8 and duty of disclosure. 19
13. See id § 13 ("An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his
agency'). N
14. This Note uses the terms "general" and "specific" to distinguish the two different manners in
which a fiduciary duty may arise, not the degree to which this fiduciary duty controls the relationship
between the parties. Therefore, a "general fiduciary duty" is one that generally arises at the outset of a
transaction based upon the status of the parties to the transaction, without requiring any showing that
the fiduciary performed any specific acts which would create a fiduciary duty otherwise.
15. The difficulty in determining whether or not a fiduciary relationship arises within this second
category is evident from the laundry list of factors that the Kansas Supreme Court cites as possible
indicia of a "specific" fiduciary relationship:
[Tlhe acting of one person for another, the having and the exercising of influence over one person
by another;, the reposing of confidence by one person in another;, the dominance of one person by
another, the inequality of the parties; and the dependence of one person upon another. In addition,
courts have considered weakness of age, mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the
facts involved or other conditions giving to one an advantage over the other.
First Bank v. Moden, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. 1984).
Ironically, only six years earlier, the Kansas Supreme Court appeared to have conceded that it
could not enumerate every possible factor a court could rely on to determine the existence of a specific
fiduciary relationship. See Curtis v. Freden, 585 P.2d 993, 998 (Kan. 1978) ("Whether or not a
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case. This court has refused, for that reason, to give an exact definition to fiduciary relations").
16. A discussion about the creation of specific fiduciary duties in the lending relationship is
beyond the scope of this Note, therefore the following discussion will focus solely on general fiduciary
duties created by a court's determination that a mortgage broker becomes the agent of a borrower
based solely upon her status as a "broker." For a thorough analysis of the creation of specific fiduciary
duties within the lender-borrower relationship, see Cecil 3. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An
Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719
(1994).
17. See Guilderland Reins. Co. v. Gold, 642 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("A
licensed real estate broker is a fiduciary for his client, and must exercise the utmost good faith and
loyalty in his performance").
18. See Kahler, Inc. v. Weiss, 539 N.W.2d 86, 92 (S.D. 1995) ("A real estate agent owes the
principal a fiduciary duty to use reasonable care, skill and diligence").
4 19. See Faron v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("Implicit in
[a stockbroker's fiduciary obligations to his customer] is a duty to disclose to the customer material
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/11
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Therefore, an agent breaches her fiduciary duty to her principal when she
violates a duty within the scope of the fiduciary relationship."
B. The Fiduciary Duties of Mortgage Brokers
Many authorities hold that agency law generally applies to the
relationship between a broker2' and her customer. 2 Within the agency
relationship, the broker acts as an agent of her principal/customer and owes
certain fiduciary duties to her principal.23
Some courts hold that mortgage brokers do not owe their borrowers a
general fiduciary duty, reasoning that the loan transaction is conducted at
arm's length, and is similar to the loan transaction between a mortgage lender
and her borrower.24 In contrast, other courts have held that a general
facts").
20. Authorities disagree on the breadth of the scope of an agent's fiduciary relationship. Some
legal analysts advocate a broad scope of ficuciary obligation, as enunciated by Professor DeMott: "The
fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the
beneficiary's best interests. The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the
beneficiary's." Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE
L.J. 879, 882 (1988).
Other analysts conclude that the scope of fiduciary obligation should be defined in a narrower
fashion. Under this "hypothetical bargaining" approach, a court decides the scope of fiduciary
obligation based upon what the parties would have agreed to, had they bargained over the particular
matter in question. See Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
21. Courts generally define a broker as "an agent who bargains or carries on negotiations in
behalf of his principal as an intermediary between the latter and third persons in transacting business
relative to the acquisition of contractual rights, or to the sale or purchase of any form of property, real
or personal, the custody of which is not entrusted to him for the purpose of discharging his agency."
City of Chicago v. Barnett, 88 N.E.2d 477,480 (1l 1949).
22. See 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 25 (1953) ("The primary and essential feature underlying the relation
of customer and broker is that of agency"); City of Chicago, 88 N.E.2d at 481 ("The essential and
basic feature underlying the relation of a broker to his employer is that of agency, and the principles of
law applicable to the principal and agent govern their respective rights and obligations throughout')
(quoting 8 AM. JUR. Brokers § 14 (1937)); Brown & Zortman Mach. Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 100
A.2d 98, 101 (Pa. 1953) ("Agency is one of the chief characteristics of a broker"). But see Carr v.
Cigna Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The general rule, however, is that a broker is not
the fiduciary of his customer unless the customer entrusts him with discretion to select the customer's
investments").
23. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 56 (1955) ("[A] broker when acting as an agent for a principal
occupies a fiduciary relation, in all his dealings affecting the subject matter of his agency, [and] must
act with the utmost good faith and loyalty in his interest of his principal").
24. In Cooper v. Burby, No. 387563, 1992 WL 97044, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 1992),
the court noted that the mortgage broker and borrower "stand at arm's length" and that a mortgage
broker "has a right to further its own interest in a mortgage transaction and is under no duty to
represent the customer's interest." In Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 285 (Ala. 1985), the
court did not distinguish any underlying fundamental difference in the mortgage broker-borrower
relationship, holding that "(wlhen both parties are intelligent and fully capable of taking care of
themselves and dealing at arm's length, with no confidential relations, no duty to disclose exists when
information is not requested, and mere silence is then not a fraud."
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fiduciary relationship does arise between a mortgage broker and a borrower.
Typically, courts base this relationship on agency, rather than contract26
principles. Where courts have imposed this general fiduciary duty, mortgage
brokers have typically breached this duty to their borrower in one of three
scenarios: failure to disclose loan terms; failure to disclose loan fees; and
failure to provide the most favorable loan terms or lowest loan fees.
1. Breach ofFiduciary Duty by Failure to Disclose Loan Terms
27In Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Company, a mortgage broker orally
misrepresented certain mortgage terms28 to the borrower and failed to call the
borrower's attention to the "true" terms buried in the loan documents. The
Supreme Court of California affirmed the borrower's breach of fiduciary
duty claim, holding that "a mortgage broker is customarily retained by a
borrower to act as the borrower's agent in negotiating an acceptable loan." 29
The court reasoned that agency principles combine with California real estate
25. See Gorbach v. Trupin, 254 A.2d 583, 586 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1968) ("The rights and duties ofa
broker employed to secure a loan depend on the same principles as those which govern the broker who
undertakes to find a purchaser of the property").
26. Mortgage brokers, unlike other potential fiduciaries, do not typically incur fiduciary duties
through express contractual agreements with their customers. This can be attributed to the fact that
most mortgage brokers, unlike real estate brokers, do not expressly contract to act as the borrower's
agent. Some courts, however, have held that the loan application between the borrower and the
mortgage broker itself constitutes a contractual creation of a fiduciary relationship between the
mortgage broker and borrower. In Langer v. Haber Mortgages, Ltd, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 2, 1995, at 26,
col. 4, the borrower applied with a mortgage broker, Haber Mortgage, Ltd. ("Haber"), to refinance an
existing mortgage loan, and executed a written agreement naming Haber as his agent. The borrower
subsequently signed an interest rate agreement with a third-party mortgage lender located by Haber,
ARCS Mortgage, Inc. ("ARCS"). Pursuant to this agreement, ARCS would "lock" the borrower into a
specific interest rate for the duration of the loan processing period. Although ARCS denied the
borrower's application, Haber misrepresented to the borrower that ARCS had approved the loan. The
court held that the loan application agreement naming Haber as the'borrower's agent established a
fiduciary relationship, reasoning that "by their very nature, contracts between mortgage brokers and
their clients generally create a fiduciary duty. .. " Id. Cases in which a fiduciary relationship is created
contractually appear to be the exception, not the rule. A written agreement between a borrower and
mortgage broker whereby both parties agree that the mortgage broker is not the agent of the borrower
appear to prevent a fiduciary relationship from arising contractually. However, it is unclear whether
such a disclaimer would be sufficient to prevent a fiduciary relationship from arising under agency
principles.
27. 598 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
28. Union Mortgage informed the borrowers that they had a 10-day grace period after the
payment was due before it would be considered late, whereas the true grace period was five days. In
addition, Union Mortgage disclosed that the annual percentage rate ("APR") was approximately
between seven and eight percent, when in reality, the true APR was 10%. Finally, Uniop Mortgage
indicated that a small balloon payment would be due in the 37th month, but the true balloon provision
permitted the unreduced loan principal to be deferred, resulting in a balloon payment $1340 more than
the original loan principal. See id at 48-49.
29. Id. at 50.
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law to "impose upon mortgage brokers an obligation to make a full and
accurate disclosure of the terms of a loan to borrowers and to act always in
the utmost good faith toward their principals."30 Other recent California
decisions suggest that a mortgage broker's general fiduciary obligation to
disclose loan terms continues to be enforced.3'
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Failure to Disclose Loan Fees
In Rushing v. Stephanus,32 a mortgage broker required a borrower to sign
mortgage-related documents, leaving several sections blank.33 Unbeknownst
to the borrower, the mortgage broker increased the agreed-upon amount of
the loan by $1600 to cover undisclosed loan costs and broker's
commissions. 4 The Supreme Court of Washington held that the mortgage
broker, as an agent of the borrower,35 breached his fiduciary duty to "reveal
the nature and extent of his fees to the client for whom he acts."
6
3. Breach ofFiduciary Duty by Failure to Provide Best Possible Loan
Terms
In Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith,37  a mortgage broker persuaded
prospective borrowers to increase their loan amount so that it would exceed
the statutory limits for regulated loans under state law.38 Because the
borrower's loan amount exceeded the statutory limits, the mortgage broker
30. Id. But cf Mitchell v. Aames Home Loan Co., No. B021272, 1987 WL 13307, at *5 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 21, 1987) (holding that "although [a] mortgage broker certainly has a fiduciary duty of oral
disclosure as to certain matters," this duty does not require a mortgage broker to make the borrower
aware of the existence of an arbitration clause on the rear page of the loan instructions).
31. See Munday v. Real Estate Advisors, Inc., No. C-95-20143-JW, 1995 WL 549015, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1995) (citing Wyatt for favorable support that a mortgage broker breached its
fiduciary duty to a borrower by failing to disclose that the non-recording of certain documents is not
the custom in the real estate industry and could give rise to fraud); Umet Trust v. Santa Monica Med.
Inv. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d 864, 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the mortgage broker breached
his fiduciary duty to a borrower by misrepresenting or fhiling to disclose the negative legal
consequences of sale leaseback financing).
32. 393 P.2d 281 (Wash. 1964).
33. The borrower signed the following forms in blank: a loan application, a note, a mortgage, and
a hold-harmless agreement. See id at 282.
34. See id.
35. The court did not explain its reasons for applying agency principles to this transaction.
Instead, the court merely stated that the mortgage broker's actions were "a breach of the duty of
loyalty which an agent has to his principal." Id. at 283.
36. Id at 284. The court proceeded to hold that "[w]here there has been a breach of the fiduciary
relationship in addition to the partial concealment of fees," the mortgage broker must forfeit his
compensation for the disobedient conduct. Id.
37. 108 Cal. Rptr. 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
38. Seeid at73.
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could charge a higher broker commission.39 The California Court of Appeals
held that the mortgage broker breached his fiduciary duty to the prospective
borrowers, because "[m]ortgage loan brokers ... hold themselves out to
prospective borrowers as loan experts who will endeavor to obtain for
prospective borrowers... a loan adequate for their needs and at the lowest
practicable cost.,'*O
This theory has found broad application in connection with recent
litigation alleging that mortgage brokers breach their general fiduciary duty
to borrowers when they accept "yield-spread premiums AI from mortgage
lenders. Yield-spread premiums are defined as "any compensation received
by a mortgage broker.., for originating a loan at [an interest] rate and/or
points42 above that which the lender would otherwise agree to make the
loan.' ' 3 Two recent Virginia cases, Byrd v. Crosstate Mortgage and Inv.,
Inc.44 and Archer v. Sterling,45 analyze whether mortgage brokers breach a
general fiduciary duty to borrowers by accepting undisclosed yield-spread
premium payments from third-party lenders.46 Although the mortgage
39. See id. At the time the loans in this case were made, California's Necessitous Borrower's Act
applied to first mortgages under $10,000 and junior liens under $5000. See 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 886, s.
24, p. 2339. The Necessitous Borrower's Act regulated the maximum commission a lender could
charge a borrower. The law, however, did not limit the amount of commission a lender could charge
on loan amounts greater than these statutory limits. See id.
40. Realty Projects, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76 (emphasis added). The court held that the mortgage
broker possessed no economic justification for inducing the borrower to take a loan amount in excess
of the statutory limits. The court concluded that the amount of each loan was determined solely by the
fact that commissions could be charged "substantially in excess of those permitted on regulated loans."
Id. at 74.
41. This Note uses the term "yield-spread premium" to describe payments a mortgage broker
receives from a mortgage lender, but it is not uncommon for the term "overage" to be used
interehangably. See Neal Gendler, "Yield Spread Premium" Suits Prompt Questions About Broker
Business, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Feb. 15, 1997, at 04H, available in 1997 WL 7554523.
The practice of using these two terms interchangably is technically incorrect, because "overage" refers
to any discount points charged that are in excess of the amount of discount points a mortgage provider
must charge.
42. Discount points are prepaid interest on the mortgage loan paid at the time of the loan closing.
Each point is equal to one percent of the loan amount.
43. Robert M. Jaworski, Overages: To Pay or Not to Pay, That Is the Question, 113 BANKING
L.J. 909, 910 (1996). The investor essentially pays the mortgage broker a fee representing a portion of
the additional interest she will collect as a result of the mortgage broker charging the borrower a
higher-than-market interest rate or greater upfront fees (i.e., discount points).
44. 34 Va. Cir. 17; Case No. LW-3263-4 (1994).
45. 34 Va. Cir. 17; Case No. LW-3264-4 (1994).
46. Because the facts and issues presented in both of these cases were virtually identical, the
court ruled on both cases in one opinion. In Byrd v. Crosstate, 34 Va. Cir. 17; Case No. LW-3263-4
(1994), a mortgage broker collected a total of $1251.57 in connection with the plaintiff's mortgage
loan. This amount consisted of $220 in discount points and service charges paid by the borrower to the
broker, a $280 broker fee paid by the borrower to the broker and $551.57 in yield-spread premium
paid by the third-party lender to the broker. Only the broker fee was disclosed to the borrower prior to
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brokers argued that they had no fiduciary duty to their respective borrowers,
the court summarily declared that the "defendants' assertions that they are
not fiduciaries are utterly without merit."47 The court reasoned that the
mortgage brokers breached their fiduciary duty to disclose "all facts within
the broker's knowledge which may be material to the transaction" when the
brokers did not disclose all fees-including those paid by third parties-that
were paid to the mortgage brokers at closing.
48
III. ANALYSIS
A. General Fiduciary Duty of Mortgage Lenders
As a general rule, courts do not impose a general fiduciary duty on
mortgage lenders.49 Most courts hold that mortgage loan transactions
between mortgage lenders and their borrowers are arms-length transactions
5°
between creditors and debtors.51 Because a mortgage lender (unlike a
mortgage broker) is the actual provider of the mortgage funds, most courts
closing. See id. In Archer v. Sterling, 34 Va. Cir. 17; Case No. LW-3264-4 (1994), a mortgage broker
collected $1146.41 in connection with the plaintiff's mortgage loan. This amount consisted of $494 in
discount points and service charges paid by the plaintiff to the broker, a $198 broker fee paid by the
plaintiff to the broker, and $354.41 in yield-spread premium paid by a third-party lender to the broker.
Once again, the broker only disclosed the broker fee to the plaintiffprior to closing. See id.
47. 34 Va. Cir. 17,21(1994).
48. Id. at 20.
49. See Mid-America Nat'l Bank v. First Say. & Loan of South Holland, 515 N.E.2d 176, 181
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("[TIhe conventional mortgagor-mortgage relationship .... standing alone, is
insufficient to sustain an allegation of a fiduciary or special relationship"); Vacinek v. First Nat'l Bank
of Pine City, 416 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("A bank is generally not its customer's
fiduciary unless the bank knows or ought to know its customer is placing confidence in the bank"); UT
Communications Credit Corp. v. Resort Dev., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 699, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("As a
matter of law, absent some other evidence of a fiduciary relationship, there is no such relationship
between a bank as lender and its customer as borrower"); Production Credit Ass'n v. Crof 423
N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("'he mere existence of a lender-borrower-customer
relationship does not create a fiduciary relationship").
50. See Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) ("[A] bank and its customer may be
said to stand at arm's length in negotiating the terms and conditions of a mortgage loan").
51. See Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 285 (Ala. 1985) ("[Ihe relationship between
a bank and its customers has been traditionally viewed by courts as a creditor-debtor relationship
which does not impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure on the bank"); Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) ("In the absence of special circumstances, the legal
relationship between a lending institution and its customer is that of debtor and creditor"); Deist v.
Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1984) ("The relationship between a bank and its customer is
generally described as that of debtor and creditor and as such does not rise to fiduciary
responsibilities") (citation omitted); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 321
(Ohio 1979) ("The relationship of debtor and creditor without more is not a fiduciary relationship. A
fiduciary relationship may be created out of an informal relationship, but this is done only when both
parties understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed").
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reason that the borrower's interests are protected by the process of arms-
length bargaining between adverse parties.52 Although many courts hold that
subsequent circumstances may give rise to a specific fiduciary relationship
between a mortgage lender and a borrower,53 this Note focuses on whether a
fiduciary duty arises solely by virtue of the legal status of the particular
mortgage provider.54
B. General Fiduciary Duty and Other Brokers
All brokers do not attain the same fiduciary relationship with a customer,
rather, the level of duty a broker owes a client depends on the extent of the
parties' relationship.55 Therefore, in order to compare the degree of general
fiduciary duty required of brokers, this Note analyzes other broker/client
relationships that closely resemble the relationship between mortgage
brokers and borrowers. These examples clearly indicate that other brokers,
acting in a capacity and under circumstances similar to a mortgage broker,
typically owe a very limited general fiduciary duty to their clients, if any.
Although real estate brokers do owe a general fiduciary duty to their
principals, the duties and responsibilities of mortgage brokers and real estate
brokers are readily distinguishable.
1. Consumer Loan Brokers
A consumer loan broker is a non-lender, such as a car dealer, that serves
as an intermediary between a purchaser of consumer goods (e.g., car
purchaser) and a potential lender. In Blon v. Bank One, Akron, NA., 56 a car
52. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[l~t would be anomalous to
require a lender to act as a fiduciary for interests on the opposite side of the negotiating table").
53. See Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 721 (N.D. 1989) ("Some courts have
recognized that a fiduciary relationship may arise under circumstances which reflect a borrower's
reposing of faith, confidence and trust in a bank with a resulting domination, control, or influence
exercised by the bank over the borrower's affairs"). Professor Cecil J. Hunt has categorized the special
circumstances that courts look at in determining whether a lender-borrower relationship extends
beyond the normal arms-length relationship between a mortgage lending institution and a borrower.
Three categories of factors cited for "special circumstances" are: (1) the borrower reposes special trust
and or confidence in the lender, (2) the borrower receives and relies on advice rendered by the lender,
and (3) the lender gains superiority, influence, dominion or control over the borrower. See Hunt, supra
note 16, at 740-41.
54. For the purpose of this Note, the term "mortgage provider" refers to both mortgage brokers
and mortgage lenders, collectively.
55. See Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the "mere
existence of a broker-customer relationship is not proof of its fiduciary character").
56. 519 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio 1988).
(VOL. 75:1737
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/11
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF MORTGAGE BROKERS
dealership failed to disclose a "finder's fee 5 7 paid to them by Bank One "for
preparing and placing the Blons' loan with Bank One.""8 The court held that
neither Bank One nor the car dealership was under a fiduciary duty to
disclose this fee because the car loan "was nothing more than an ordinary
arm's-length transaction."59 The court reasoned that:
a creditor and consumer stand at arm's-length in negotiating the terms
and conditions of a consumer loan and, absent an understanding by
both parties that a special trust and confidence has been reposed in the
creditor, the creditor has no duty to disclose to the consumer the
existence and details of a finder's fee or similar arrangement with a
credit arranger.
60
Similar to a consumer loan broker, a mortgage broker serves only as an
intermediary between the borrower and the ultimate provider of funds.
Therefore, as long as the mortgage broker makes all the proper disclosures to
the borrower, the broker should not be held to a higher standard.
61
57. Bank One paid West Chevrolet, the car dealer, a fee of three percent of the loan amount
pursuant to a sliding fee schedule agreement between Bank One and West Chevrolet See id. at 365.
58. Id.
59. lId at 368. Another recent case which arrives at a similar decision is Perino v. Mercury Fin.
Co. ofll., 912 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ill. 1995). In this case the plaintiff purchased a used car from
Mancari's Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. ("Mancari Chrysler"). See id. at 314. Mancari Chrysler agreed to
arrange financing for the plaintiff through MFC Illinois, a "'sales finance agency' whose primary
business included purchasing individual installment sales contracts from automobile dealers and retail
vendors." lat Mancari Chrysler executed a retail installment contract with the plaintiff at an APR of
41.04%. MC Illinois subsequently purchased the plaintiff's installment contract from Mancari
Chrysler at an APR lower than 41.04%, crediting part of the difference between the two rates back to
Mancari Chrysler. See id. The plaintiff claimed that MFC's undisclosed payment of this money to
Mancari Chrysler "induced the dealer to breach the duty it owned [the plaintiff] as his agent and that
MFC Illinois' conduct is explicitly illegal." Id. at 318. The court held that "the alleged failure to
disclose this discount does not violate either federal or state law" because MFC Illinois "made all
required disclosures under the federal Truth-In-Lending Act." Id.
60. Blon, 519 N.E.2d at 368.
61. But see Robert A. Cook, Yield-Spread Premiums Come Under Attack, 48 CONSuMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 94, 96 (Winter 1994) (asserting that mortgage brokers are distinguishable from consumer
loan brokers because it is "reasonable for borrowers to expect that [mortgage] brokers with whom they
have entered into a contractual relationship owe some duty to them to obtain the best loan possible").
Cook's attempt to differentiate these two types of brokers is incorrect. While a borrower may pay a
mortgage broker a broker fee, this fee is not paid to secure the best terms for the borrower. Rather, this
fee covers the broker's costs in processing and placing the mortgage loan. Unlike mortgage brokers,
consumer loan brokers typically incur only nominal costs in connection with processing the loan
financing because the costs of processing the consumer loan applications are borne by the provider of
the finds.
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2. Stock Brokers
Although the stockbroker/customer relationship is governed primarily by
agency62 and securities laws,63 stockbrokers also may be liable to their
customers based on a breach of fiduciary duty. Because stockbrokers provide
their customers with a wide variety of services, ranging from simply
executing a customer's purchase or sales orders to exercising complete
management control over a customer's portfolio, courts typically consider
the circumstances surrounding the alleged wrongdoing. In determining
whether a stockbroker owes his customer a fiduciary duty, courts give
considerable weight to whether the stockbroker managed a discretionary
accounte or a non-discretionary account65 on behalf of her customer.
Courts that make this distinction typically hold that a stockbroker who
manages a discretionary account for a customer incurs a general fiduciary
duty to the customer,67 whereas a stockbroker managing a non-discretionary
account does not
68
Similar to stockbrokers managing non-discretionary accounts, a mortgage
62. For a brief discussion of the application of agency law to the stockbroker/customer
relationship, see Carol R. Goforth, Stockbrokers' Duties To Their Customers, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J
407,409-12 (1989).
63. For a brief discussion of the application of securities laws to the stockbroker/customer
relationship, see id. at 412-17.
64. A discretionary account is one in which the stockbroker, rather than the customer, decides
which purchases and sales to make.
65. A non-discretionary account is one in which the customer, rather than the stockbroker,
decides which purchases and sales to make. The stockbroker simply executes purchase or sales
contracts on behalf of the customer.
66. See Goforth, supra note 62, at 422 ("A number of courts have held that the decision to
impose fiduciary obligations upon a broker turns on whether the account handled by the broker was
discretionary or non-discretionary").
67. See Ohio Co. v. Nemecek, 886 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("A fiduciary
relationship arises between a broker and his customer when the broker is handling a discretionary
account"); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich.
1978) ("Unlike the broker who handles a non-discretionary account, the broker handling a
discretionary accoint becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense"); Rupert v. Clayton
Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 737 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) ("Where a customer
relinquishes practical control over his brokerage account to a stockbroker, the broker owes wide-
ranging fiduciary duties to the customer to manage the account in accordance with the customer's
needs and objectives").
68. See Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[N]o fiduciary duty arises
between a broker and his client in relation to a non-discretionary commodity trading account");
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Although in some
circumstances a broker would stand in a fiduciary relationship to its customer, those circumstances are
not present... [with] a 'nonsupervised' . . . account"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Boeck, 377 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Wis. 1985) ("[A] broker does not owe a fiduciary duty to an investor-
customer who makes all of the investment decisions, unless there is an express agreement placing a
greater obligation on the broker or other special circumstances").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/11
1997] FIDUCIARY DUTY OF MORTGAGE BROKERS 1749
broker does not possess the discretionary authority to bind a borrower to loan
terms and fees without the borrower's approval. Federal law requires that all
mortgage providers must provide a Good Faith EstimateP9 to the borrower
within three business days of the loan application. 70 Based upon this Good
Faith Estimate, the borrower possesses the ability to compare loan terms and
fees with those offered by other lenders well in advance of the loan closing.
3. Real Estate Brokers
In a typical real estate transaction, the real estate broker creates an agency
relationship with the seller7' by means of a written agreement, known as a
listing agreement 72 Under this agreement, the real estate broker ("listing
broker") enters into a listing agreement with the seller, and contracts to act as
the seller's exclusive agent for the sale of seller's home. Within the listing
agreement, the listing broker typically agrees to accept offers from other real
estate brokers who represent potential purchasers. These other real estate
brokers ("selling agents") become subagents of the seller by virtue of the
listing agreement. Once this agency relationship is established, the real estate
broker owes certain fiduciary duties to her principal: good faith, loyalty,73
due diligence and disclosure.7 4
Significant differences between the powers and duties held by real estate
69. If the mortgage broker is an exclusive agent of the mortgage lender, then either the mortgage
lender or the mortgage broker must provide a Good Faith Estimate. If the mortgage broker is not an
exclusive agent of the mortgage lender, the mortgage broker must provide the Good Faith Estimate to
the borrower. See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(a) (1997) ("Regulation X").
The Good Faith Estimate provides the borrower with the mortgage provider's estimate of the cost
of each of the following fees: loan origination fee; loan discount points; appraisal; credit report; lender
inspection fee; mortgage broker fee; prepaid interest; mortgage insurance premium; hazard insurance
premium; settlement fee; title insurance; document preparation; notary fee; attorney fee; recording fee;
survey; pest inspection; commitment fee; and tax stamps. See 24 C.F.R § 3500 app. A (1977).
70. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) § 2604(d), 12 U.S.C. § 2601
(1994).
71. A real estate broker may also create an agency relationship with a home purchaser through an
express written agreement, known as a buyer's brokerage agreement. Situations may also arise in
which a real estate agent owes certain fiduciary duties to a home seller or purchaser that arise outside
of any agency relationship. See Brett L. Hopper, Comment The Selling Real Estate Broker and the
Purchaser: Assessing the Relationship, 1992 BYU L. REV. 1135 (1992).
72. Although the written listing agreement usually serves as the basis of the agency relationship
between a real estate broker and a home seller, courts have inferred this agency relationship from
parties' oral statements or conduct. See Miller v. Boeger, 405 P.2d 573, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965)
(holding that a "limited agency relationship [was] initiated at the time the [sellers] gave to the real
estate agent an oral listing'); Anderson v. Thacher, 172 P.2d 533, 541 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) ("An
agency may be created not only by written instrument or word of mouth, but also may be implied from
the conduct of the parties").
73. See Wegg v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 557 P.2d 861 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
74. See Veach v. Meyeres Real Estate, Inc., 599 P.2d 746 (Alaska 1979).
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brokers and mortgage brokers allow the latter to be easily distinguished from
the former. First, unlike real estate brokers, mortgage brokers rarely contract
in writing to act as a borrower's agent. In order to impose an agency
relationship on mortgage brokers, courts must usually infer the agency
requirements from the intentions of the parties, a process far more susceptible
to error than that of real estate brokers, whose agency agreement is in
writing. Second, the real estate agent is in a much greater position to
influence or bind her principal than a mortgage broker. In order for a real
estate broker to procure prospective buyers (either by herself or with the
assistance of a selling broker), a real estate broker must perform certain acts
that influence or bind her principal, including making representations
regarding the property to all potential buyers and negotiating the sales
contract terms on behalf of the seller. Both of these actions give a real estate
broker the opportunity to speak for or influence the principal. In contrast, the
mortgage broker's ability to influence the borrower's actions are limited to
presenting the terms upon which the mortgage lender will provide the
mortgage funds. The borrower alone is able to bind herself to any terms and
conditions of the subsequent agreement with the mortgage lender.
Additionally, the listing agreement usually requires a seller to agree to use
one real estate broker exclusively. This fact places a higher degree of
responsibility upon the listing broker selected because the seller cannot
unilaterally cancel this contract or rely on any other persons to provide these
same services. Conversely, a borrower is free to make a loan application with
more than one mortgage broker, which insures that the borrower can switch
to the services of a different mortgage broker if her current broker is not
performing his duties satisfactorily.
Regardless of the inherent differences between real estate brokers and
mortgage brokers, four states disregard these differences and maintain laws
that statutorily impose the identical agency responsibilities on mortgage
brokers that exist for real estate brokers.75 In these states, mortgage brokers
are deemed to have entered into an agency relationship with their borrowers
and, as a result, acquire general fiduciary duties to their borrowers.
C. Regulation ofMortgage Brokers
In the past, it appears that courts imposed a fiduciary duty of disclosure
on mortgage brokers in large part to protect unwitting borrowers76 from the
75. For a list of these states, see infra note 81.
76. Often, where a mortgage broker is deemed to have breached a general fiduciary duty of
disclosure, courts have justified their decisions in part based upon the financial naivet6 of the
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lax or non-existent regulation of mortgage brokers at the state and federal
level." Continued judicial regulation of mortgage brokers via a general
fiduciary duty is unnecessary, based upon existing and proposed laws at the
state and federal level that require the disclosure of loan terms and all loan
fees and provide for adequate enforcement mechanisms.
1. State Regulation of Mortgage Brokers
States currently possess several methods for regulating mortgage brokers.
First, states may impose licensing requirements on mortgage brokers.
Currently, thirty-nine states require some level of licensing for mortgage
brokers.78 Twenty-nine states require the payment of a fee and proof of a
minimum net worth and/or pledge of a surety bond in order to receive a
license.79 Six states require proof of the person's competence as a mortgage
borrower. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 783 (Cal. 1979) (stating that
borrowers "were persons of modest means and limited experience in financial affairs"); Rushing v.
Stephanus, 64 Wash. 2d 607, 608 (Wash. 1964) (stating that the borrower "is a side-sewer contractor,
and has only a fifth grade education. His wife's formal education ended in the 10th grade. Both were
found to have a limited ability to read and understand technical language.").
77. Although Professor Frankel argues that "the decline of legal and social controls over those
who offer services" increases the importance of fiduciary obligations, this is certainly not the current
trend within the mortgage industry. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 802
(1983). In addition to extensive federal regulations of mortgage providers, there are currently 39 states
that regulate mortgage brokers through the licensing process. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text for a complete breakdown of these regulations.
78. The I I states that do not regulate mortgage brokers through the licensing process are: Alaska,
Colorado, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and
Wyoming.
79. The following states only impose minimal monetary requirements for procuring a mortgage
broker's license: Alabama: ALA. CONST. Amend. no. 154 (requiring payment of a $100 occupational
license tax for license); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-39-301 et seq. (Michie 1987) (requiring
payment of $250 fee, proof of $25,000 net worth, and pledge of surety bond for license); Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-486 etseq. (West 1996) (requiring payment of $200 fee and pledge of surety
bond for license); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2102 etseq. (1974) (requiring payment of $250
fee and pledge of $25,000 surety bond for license); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-1000 etseq. (West
Supp. 1996) (requiring payment of investigation fee and pledge of $25,000 surety bond or proof of
$50,000 net worth for license); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 454-1 et seq. (1985) (requiring payment
of $100 fee and pledge of $15,000 surety bond for license); Illinois: 250 ILL. COMP. STAT. 635/2-1 et
seq. (West 1992) (requiring payment of $1000 fee, pledge of $100,000 fidelity bond, and proof of
$35,000 net worth for license); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-5-5 et seq. (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring payment of $250 fee and pledge of $25,000 surety bond for license); Iowa: IOWA CODE
ANN. § 535B.4 et seq. (West 1997) (requiring payment of $500 and pledge of $15,000 surety bond for
license); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1003 et seq. (1994) (requiring payment of $250 fee and
pledge of $25,000 surety bond for license); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.030 etseq. (Miehie
1988) (requiring payment of $150 investigation fee, payment of $300 licensing fee, and pledge of
$5,000 surety bond for license); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:1083 et seq. (West Supp. 1997)
(requiring payment of $100 fee for license); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN. [FIN. INST.] § 11-504 et seq.
(1993) (requiring payment of $100 investigation fee, payment of $500 license fee, and pledge of
$12,500 surety bond for license); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. cl. 255E, § 2 etseq. (West
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broker (written test/prior lending experience) in addition to other monetary
requirements.80 Four states impose an even greater requirement on mortgage
brokers by subjecting them to the licensing requirements imposed on real
estate brokers.81
Supp. 1997) (requiring payment of an investigation fee for license); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.1652 etseq. (West Supp. 1997) (requiring payment of an investigation fee of at least $400
(but not more than $1000) and proof of $25,000 net worth for license); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 81-19-9 etseq. (1972) (requiring payment of $300 fee and pledge of $25,000 surety bond for license
as "consumer loan broker"); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.800 et seq. (West Supp. 1997)
(requiring payment of fee and pledge of surety bond for license); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-
191.02 et seq. (1993) (requiring payment of $50 filing fee to file a copies of disclosure statement);
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 397-A:3 et seq. (1996) (requiring payment of $250 fee and
pledge of $20,000 surety bond for license); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21-3 et seq. (Michie
1978) (requiring payment of $400 fee and pledge of $25,000 surety bond for registration certificate);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-235 etseq. (1996) (requiring payment of $250 fee for license);
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1322.02 et seq. (Anderson Supp. 1996) (requiring payment of $350 fee
and proof of $25,000 net worth for certificate of registration); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 456.03 etseq. (West 1992) (requiring payment of $500 fee and pledge of $10,000 bond for license);
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-58-30 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1976) (requiring payment of $500
fee and pledge of $10,000 surety bond for registration); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-13-103 et
seq. (1993) (requiring payment of $100 investigation fee, payment of $500 license fee, pledge of
$25,000 surety bond, and proof of $25,000 net worth for license); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 70D-1-10
etseq. (1953) (requiring payment of $200 fee for license); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-410 et seq.
(Michie 1950) (requiring payment of $500 fee and pledge of $5000 bond for license); Washington:
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.146.205 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring pledge of $60,000 bond for
license); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 224.72 et seq. (West Supp. 1996) (requiring pledge of
$25,000 surety bond and proof of$ 100,000 net worth for "loan solicitor" license).
80. The following six states impose educational or experience requirements in addition to other
monetary requirements: Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-903 et seq. (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring, in addition to payment of a fee and pledge of a bond, (1) three years experience in
mortgage lending, (2) completion of a designated course of study, and (3) passing a standardized
mortgage broker's test within one year of licensing); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 494.0033 et seq.
(West 1997) (requiring 24 hours of classroom education and passing a written test for license); Idaho:
IDAHO CODE § 26-3108 (1990) (requiring, in addition to payment of $200 fee, proof of three years
experience in lending for license); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:11B-1 et seq. (West 1984)
(requiring, in addition to payment of fee not to exceed $1,000 and bond not less than $25,000,
successful completion of examination aproved by commissioner or demonstration that applicant has
five years experience as a mortgage broker or mortgage banker); New York: N.Y. [BANKING] LAW
§ 592-a (McKinney Supp. 1997) (requiring, in addition to payment of $500 fee, proof of experience or
educational background in lending for license); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 59-845 et seq. (1995)
(requiting, in addition to payment of fee and pledge of $10,000 surety bond, proof of three years
experience in lending).
81. The following four states require mortgage brokers to be licensed as real estate brokers:
California: CAL. [BUS. & PROF.] CODE § 10131(d) (West 1987) (stating that a real estate broker
includes a person who "solicits borrowers or lenders for or negotiates loans... secured directly or
collaterally by liens on real property"); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.17, subd. 4, (b) (West
Supp. 1997) (stating that a real estate broker includes any person who "for another and for
commission, fee or other valuable consideration or with the intention or expectation of receiving the
same, directly or indirectly negotiates or offers or attempts to negotiate a loan, secured or to be secured
by a mortgage or other encumbrance on real estate"); Rhode Island: RI. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.5-1(4)
(1956) (stating that a real estate broker includes all persons who "negotiate or attempt to negotiate a
loan secured or to be secured by mortgage or other encumbrance upon a transfer of any real estate);
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In addition to licensing requirements, states can regulate the activities of
mortgage brokers through various types of consumer protection laws that
permit borrowers to sue mortgage providers for certain violations. These
laws typically require lenders (including mortgage brokers) to disclose all
relevant loan terms and fees, including any yield-spread premiums.82
2. Federal Regulation of Mortgage Brokers
In addition to these state laws, two relatively recent83 statutes provide
comprehensive regulation of mortgage providers at the federal level: the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (' RESPA")84 and the Truth In Lending Act
("TILA"). 85 These statutes regulate mortgage providers in their disclosure of
all direct and indirect fees assessed to the borrower.
Direct fees are those fees paid by the borrower in connection with the
processing or closing of the mortgage loan. Under RESPA, all mortgage
providers must disclose to borrowers an estimate of each charge "that the
borrower will normally pay or incur at or before settlement based upon
common practice in the locality of the mortgage property,"86 including any
mortgage broker fees paid to mortgage brokers.8 7 In addition, mortgage
providers must calculate the mortgage loan's Annual Percentage Rate
("APR") based on the total finance charges the borrower will pay in
connection with the loan.88 TILA appears to require mortgage brokers to
include any broker fees they assess borrowers in the calculation of the
finance charge.89 Therefore, the APR that the mortgage broker discloses to
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-21A-6(11) (Michie 1994) (stating that a real estate
broker includes any person who "[a]cts as a mortgage broker").
82. See Smith v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 626 So. 2d 1266 (Ala. 1993) (holding that
Alabama Consumer Credit Act's requirement of disclosure of all finance charges includes disclosure
of yield-spread premiums paid to mortgage brokers); Cullen v. Investment Strategies, Inc., 911 P.2d
936 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act requires mortgage
brokers to disclose yield-spread premiums paid to a mortgage broker by an investor).
83. Both of these statutes were enacted in 1974.
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1994) RESPA regulates all "federally regulated mortgage loans"
including both purchase money mortgages and refinance mortgages.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1994).
86. Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(cX2) (1997).
87. The 1992 Revised Regulation X specifically added "mortgage broker fees" to the list of fees
requiring disclosure.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994) ("Determination of annual percentage rate").
89. Section 1605 of TILA ("Determiniation of finance charge") requires that "the amount of the
finance charge... shall be determined as the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the
person to whom the credit is extended." 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994). Examples of charges that are
included in the finance charge include "[b]orrower-paid mortgage broker fees, including fees paid
directly to the broker or the lender (for delivery to the broker) whether such fees are paid in cash or
financed." 15 U.S.C. § 1605(aX6) (1994).
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the borrower is an accurate calculation of all direct fees the borrower will pay
in connection with their loan, allowing the borrower to compare the loan's
total "sticker price" with loans offered by other mortgage providers. RESPA
and TILA, with their explicit disclosure requirements, are a much more
effective method for ensuring the correct disclosure of loan terms and fees
than the imposition of a general fiduciary duty.
Indirect fees are all fees paid to mortgage brokers by parties other than the
borrower in connection with the processing or closing of the borrower's
mortgage loan. In 1992, HUD adopted the position that mortgage brokers"
are required to disclose all indirect fees received in connection with a
borrower's mortgage loan.91 After mortgage brokers complained that this
requirement "placed mortgage brokers on an unequal footing with other
mortgage loan providers and that information on indirect fees was confusing
to borrowers," HUD engaged in rulemaking activities on this topic.92 The
result of these rulemaking activities is a proposed rule, whereby mortgage
brokers would be ensured that "direct fees received from the borrower, as
well as the indirect fees paid to the broker from a lender for the transaction,
will be covered by a 'qualified safe harbor' and presumed legal and
permissible under section 8 of RESPA."93 This presumption of legality may
be rebutted if the mortgage broker does not meet the criteria of the safe
harbor which includes disclosing to borrowers whether the mortgage broker
will receive any indirect fees from mortgage lenders.94 The final rule that
emerges from these rulemaking activities will continue to require disclosure
of all fees, both direct and indirect, earned by mortgage brokers in
connection with the mortgage transaction.
In addition to these existing and proposed laws, there currently is a very
90. The amended Regulation X defined mortgage broker for the first time: "mortgage broker
means a person (not an employee of a lender) who brings a borrower and lender together to obtain a
federally related mortgage loan" 24 C.F.R. § 3500.2(b) (1997).
91. "[A]ny other fee or payment received by the mortgage broker from either the lender or the
borrower arising from the initial funding transaction, including a servicing release premium or yield
spread premium, is to be noted on the Good Faith Estimate." 24 C.F.R. § 3500, app. B, Fact Situation
13 (1997). These disclosure requirements, however, do not apply to mortgage brokers who fund
mortgage loans either with their own funds or with a warehouse line of credit. The reason for this
exception is that RESPA does not require disclosure of fees paid in secondary market transactions. See
24 C.F.R. § 3500.5(b)(7) (1997).
92. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Disclosure of Fees Paid to Mortgage
Brokers: Proposed Rule and Notice of Proposed Information Collection Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg.
53,912,53,913 (1997).
93. Id.at53,912.
94. See id. Although the criteria for the safe harbor will be finalized in the final rule, a number of
tests have been recommended that would allow mortgage brokers to establish "with certainty whether
total compensation to a broker is or is not legal." Id.
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compelling monetary disincentive for third-party mortgage lenders to pay
indirect fees, such as yield-spread premiums, to mortgage brokers. An
increasing number of mortgage lenders are finding themselves the object of
class-action lawsuits based upon their payment of overages to mortgage
brokers.95 Although the legal grounds for these lawsuits vary,96 the likely
outcome of this litigation is that mortgage lenders will be much less likely to
pay overages unless they can be assured that they will not incur liability to
mortgage brokers for this payment 97 In addition, mortgage brokers may be
less likely to accept overages for these very same reasons. 9'
IV. PROPOSAL
The previous section illustrates that state and federal regulation currently
require mortgage brokers to disclose loan terms and loan fees, including all
direct and indirect fees earned by the mortgage broker. These regulations
essentially eliminate the need to impose a general fiduciary duty on mortgage
brokers to ensure disclosure of these loan terms or loan fees. In spite of this
95. See Heather Timmons, Lenders Rattled by Class Action On Broker Fees, AM. BANKER, Apr.
12, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 5563218 (quoting Joe Lefkoff, counsel for the National Home
Equity Association, as stating that there were between fifty and one hundred overage class-action
lawsuits filed against mortgage lenders across the country in 1996).
96. Two recent lawsuits demonstrate the most popular legal bases for these class-action suits:
discrimination and breach of fiduciary duty. A class-action suit brought by the Department of Justice
against Long Beach Mortgage Co. alleged that employees of the mortgage lender (including the
mortgage brokers with whom Long Beach corresponded) "routinely charged minorities, women and
elderly applicants significantly higher fees, or 'overages,' than they charged white male applicants."
Kenneth R Harney, Bias in Pricing of Mortgage Fees Cuts Across Lines of Race. Sex, Age, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 1996 at F01, available in 1996 WL 12393515. Another class-action suit brought in
1995 against GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. alleged that GE Capital "'bribed [mortgage] brokers
to breach their statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties to borrowers' ... by paying mortgage
brokers a reward for jacking up interest rates on borrowers." Jonathan S. Homblass, Lawsuit Says
General Electric Unit Bribes Loan Brokers to Hike Rate, AM. BANKER, May 16, 1995, at 8, available
in 1995 WL 6915230.
97. The following are examples of class-action suits settled by mortgage lenders who paid yield-
spread premiums to mortgage brokers and demonstrate the grave risks associated with this lending
practice:
Fleet Finance, Inc. settled a class-action suit for approximately $2.25 million in refunds and
penalties in 1994. See Kenneth R. Harney, 'Overage' Settlement Raises Question: Must Loan Brokers
Seek Best Rate?. WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1994, at F03, available in 1994 WL 2448250.
Long Beach Mortgage Co. settled a class-action suit brought by the Department of Justice for
approximately $4 million. See Kenneth R. Harney, Bias in Pricing of Mortgage Fees Cuts Across
Lines of Race, Sex, Age, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1996, at FO, available in 1996 WL 12393515.
98. See Harney, supra note 97, at F03. ("The [class-action settlement against Fleet Mortgage]
also opens the door to further legal challenges to mortgage brokers on the grounds that they breach
their fiduciary duties to customers when they pocket overages. Under some interpretations of common
law, mortgage brokers could be construed as having the primary duty to their clients of obtaining the
most favorable terms and rates available").
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fact, some critics still contend that a general fiduciary duty should be
imposed to ensure that mortgage brokers provide the best possible loan terms
and lowest fees to the borrower.
First, this requirement would impose a discriminatory standard upon
mortgage brokers that is not required of all other mortgage providers. The
line that distinguishes mortgage brokers from banks and mortgage bankers is
far from clear,99 and extracting a higher degree of duty from mortgage
brokers has no practical basis.
Second, a mortgage broker should not be legally required to provide the
lowest possible price to its borrowers. This very issue is at the center of the
current debate over the payment of yield-spread premiums by mortgage
lenders to mortgage brokers.1°° Critics who advocate requiring brokers to
provide the lowest possible rates and fees to borrowers ignore the fact that a
borrower seeking to purchase or refinance a home is only concerned with the
"bottom-line" cost that he or she must pay for the mortgage funds, and this
"bottom line" cost will reflect any yield-spread premium payments received
by the mortgage broker.'01 Because current federal regulations have
standardized the manner in which a mortgage provider must disclose interest
rates and loan fees, a borrower is free to compare the total cost a mortgage
broker will charge with the total cost of any other mortgage provider.10 2 Also,
the argument that mortgage brokers must provide the lowest cost, fees and
99. In its most recent revision to the settlement cost booklet that all borrowers receive at the loan
application, HUD explicitly states that a "mortgage broker may operate as an independent business and
may not be operating as your 'agent' or representative." Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; Notice
of Revision of Special Information Booklet, 62 Fed. Reg. 31982, 31990 (1997). This language
suggests that mortgage brokers, similar to mortgage lenders, stand at arm's length from their
borrowers in the mortgage transaction.
100. For a detailed discussion of the debate over payment of yield-spread premiums, see supra
notes 41-48, 90-98.
101. Because mortgage lenders only pay mortgage brokers yield-spread premiums if they can
convince borrowers to accept higher-than-market interest rates or loan fees, these higher interest rates
or loan fees will result in a higher APR.
102. It is logical that mortgage brokers who receive yield-spread premiums from mortgage lenders
for charging higher interest rates or loan fees can still be competitive with mortgage lenders who
charge their standard rates and fees. The reason for this is that mortgage lenders who rely on mortgage
brokers to originate the mortgage do not incur the direct costs of operating a retail lending office and,
as a result, can offer mortgage brokers a lower interest rate than if the mortgage lender originated the
loan through its own retail lending office. Therefore, even though the mortgage brokers may be
charging their borrowers higher interest rates or loan fees than the mortgage lenders require, these
higher rates and fees may still be equal to (or even less than) the interest rates and loan fees that
mortgage lenders who must bear the cost of maintaining a retail lending office would be able to offer.
See Kenneth R. Harney, Mortgage Brokers Earning Premiums at Buyer's Expense, WASH. POST, Aug.
5, 1995, at E01, available in 1995 WL 9255587 (quoting Mary Burt as saying that the payment of
yield-spread premiums "actually allows [national] lenders to deliver more competitive prices to
consumers because they don't need to set up expensive retail branches of their own everywhere").
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services disregards the simple fact that a mortgage broker can still act in the
best interest of the borrower without providing the lowest priced services.
Most mortgage providers are responsible for coordinating the services of
several different entities on behalf of their borrowers for the processing and
closing of the mortgage loan. Such services include: the credit report,
appraisal and private mortgage insurance. In addition, mortgage providers are
often directed by the borrower to procure other necessary items, including
title insurance, survey and pest inspection. 103 In many instances, the lowest-
priced service provider may not necessarily be the one ultimately most
beneficial to the borrower, possibly because the mortgage broker knows that
the lowest-priced service provider may be unreliable and may jeopardize the
entire loan transaction. Therefore, requiring mortgage brokers to provide the
lowest-priced loan transaction not only imposes an extreme hardship on the
mortgage broker, but it also might work against the borrower's best
interest. '" Instead, the borrower should decide the issue of "bottom line" cost
herself, using the APR disclosed by the mortgage broker to "shop around"
for the lowest overall price.
105
103. A mortgage provider is often directed to procure these services at the request of the borrower
or the borrower's attorney because the mortgage provider may receive a discounted price from these
service providers based on the volume of business a mortgage provider may refer to these businesses.
In some instances, the mortgage provider may also have a "wash agreement' with these businesses,
which allows the mortgage provider to cancel the transaction with minimal or no cost to the borrower.
The borrower or her attorney does not usually enjoy these same advantages, and therefore would want
the mortgage provider to order these services on her behalf.
104. If mortgage brokers are required to provide the lowest-price loan package to borrowers, one
option would be for mortgage brokers to furnish their borrowers with a list of all service providers
acceptable to the mortgage broker, allowing borrowers to contact these service providers and arrange
for these services themselves. However, this solution has potential drawbacks because it deprives
borrowers of the broker's expertise in selecting the service provider the mortgage broker feels will
perform the best given the borrower's individual circumstances.
105. Much of the recent literature on securing a home mortgage emphasizes comparing interest
rates and fees with several different mortgage providers. See Amy Dunkin, In the Market for a House?
You're in Luck, BUS. WK., June 5, 1995, at 131 ("Comparison-shop for a mortgage: Lenders and
mortgage brokers are in hot competition and will sometimes shave points or whittle down the interest
rate"). There are currently many opportunities for a borrower to do this recommended comparison
shopping. A borrower can secure the necessary information from:
Newspapers: Most major newspapers provide weekly updates on local mortgage providers'
interest rates and loan terms. If this information is unavailable in a particular area, HSH Associates, a
national company which monitors the mortgage industry, can provide a listing of all the lenders in a
particular region (800-873-2837).
Real estate agents: Because real estate agents must work with mortgage providers who secure
financing for their customers, real estate agents can often provide referrals to reputable mortgage
providers.
Internet: Increasingly more mortgage providers provide computer access to their interest rates and
terms via the Internet. See Elizabeth Razzi, House Hunting on the Internet, KIPLINGER'S PERs. FIN.
MAG., July 1, 1995, at 96, available in 1995 WL 10021735.
Telephone: If a borrower has the time (and does not mind the occasional high-pressure sales
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Finally, states that impose a general fiduciary duty on mortgage brokers
statutorily by requiring that they be licensed as real estate brokers possess
two alternatives. First, these states' legislatures could repeal the provisions
requiring mortgage brokers to be licensed as real estate brokers.10 6 When
most of these special licensing requirements were enacted, the level of state
and federal regulation of mortgage brokers was minimal.'0 7 Even if these
four states eliminated their special licensing requirement, they could still
maintain the requirement that mortgage brokers continue to receive the
education required of real estate brokers. Second, if states do not want to
repeal the requirement that mortgage brokers must also be licensed as real
estate brokers, the legislature could allow the resulting general fiduciary duty
created by this requirement to be a "default rule" that the mortgage broker
and borrower could contract around. In a recent article, 08 Professor Tamar
Frankel argues that most fiduciary duty rules are default rules only.'0 9
Professor Frankel proposes allowing entrustors, in this case borrowers, to
waive any fiduciary duty owed them if (1) they are "put on clear notice that,
with respect to the particular duties that they waive, they can no longer rely
on their fiduciaries" (in this case, mortgage brokers) and (2) fiduciaries
"provide entrustors with information... to enable entrustors to make an
informed independent decision regarding the waiver."'" 0
The adoption of this rule would not place an undue burden on the
borrower. Borrowers do not benefit from a general fiduciary duty in their
dealings with all mortgage providers because the law does not impose such a
duty on mortgage lenders. Moreover, state and federal regulation sufficiently
protect borrowers from the danger of non-disclosure of loan terms and fees.
Furthermore, the wealth of information currently available to borrowers who
wish to compare interest rates and fees eliminates the need for mortgage
brokers to provide the best possible terms and fees. Thus, current state and
federal regulation of mortgage brokers, in conjunction with market forces,
pitch), the most reliable source of information on a mortgage provider's interest rates and loan fees is
the mortgage provider itself. The Yellow Pages provide an excellent source of the mortgage providers
in one's area.
106. North Dakota has taken this approach. Effective December 1, 1995, North Dakota repealed
their previous requirement that mortgage brokers be licensed as real estate brokers. Previously, North
Dakota required that "no person shall act as real estate broker, real estate salesperson or mortgage
broker ... without a license issued by the real estate commission" N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23-05
(1991). The 1995 amendment deleted all references to "mortgage broker" within this section.
107. California enacted its requirement in 1959 (Stats. 1959, c. 2117, p. 4939, § 4) and Rhode
Island enacted its requirement in 1973 (P.L. 1973, ch. 215 § 2). RESPA and TILA were enacted in
1974.
108. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties As Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995).
109. See id at 1211.
110. I at 1212.
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permit courts to withhold imposition of a general fiduciary duty upon
mortgage brokers.
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